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COMMENT
THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE
TERRORISM ACT:
THE NEED FOR A
WHISTLEBLOWER EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA or
the Act) with the belief that certain commercial and institutional
enterprises were in need of increased protection from violent attacks.
The purpose of the Act was a limited one: to increase protections
against perceived threats of terrorism. The statute’s language,
however, is broad, and the bill was passed against a backdrop of
concerns that its language would be used to curb traditionally
protected activities, including whistleblowing. Because no court has
extensively analyzed the Act, these concerns persist.
The scope of this Comment is limited.1 It argues that, as AETA’s
opponents have pointed out, a literal reading of AETA’s terms may
force the conclusion that AETA prohibits certain acts of
whistleblowing. A more scrutinizing analysis, however, reveals that
the Act was never intended to halt acts of whistleblowing. AETA’s
drafters, rather, were concerned solely with prohibiting domesticterrorism threats. Courts interpreting AETA must effectuate its full
legislative intent by narrowing its application and resisting the
temptation to apply the Act to whistleblowing, even if those actions
fall within the technical language of the statute.
In addition to effectuating the legislative intent of the statute, other
factors also compel an interpretation of the Act that goes beyond its
plain terms. First, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
1 I have performed a more exacting analysis of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
elsewhere. See Michael A. Hill, Note, United States v. Fullmer and the Animal Enterprise
Terrorism Act: “True Threats” to Activism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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inspectors, animal enterprise employees, and the American public
rely on whistleblowers to aid the enforcement of state and federal
anti-cruelty laws. Second, there is an extensive and growing record of
animal-cruelty and food-safety-law violations by factory farms,
slaughterhouses, and processing plants. Because of the USDA’s poor
record of enforcement,2 a history of retaliation against insiders who
speak out, and an industry-wide refusal to self-regulate,3 the
American public is dependant on whistleblowers to protect the
integrity of America’s food supply.4
I. THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM ACT
A. Brief History of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
Critics have questioned the Act’s scope and breadth since its
inception.5 In 1992, after approximately two decades of antagonistic
relations between animal-protection advocates and medical
researchers, Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Protection Act
(AEPA).6 AEPA made it a federal crime to use interstate commerce to
cause a physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise.7 The legislative intent was clear: to protect certain
commercial and institutional enterprises from threats of domestic
terrorism.8 The language used to carry out this aim was less clear,
however. AEPA defined an “animal enterprise” as any organization
classifiable as either:
(A) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells
animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber
production, agriculture, education, research, or testing;

See discussion at infra notes 170–90.
See discussion at infra notes 190–201.
4 See discussion at infra notes 202–219.
5 See Laura G. Kniaz, Comment, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the
Underground Railroad, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 819–21 (1995) (noting that an earlier version of
AEPA, entitled the Farm Animals and Research Facilities Protection Act, met resistance on
various fronts when it was introduced to Congress, including that it was duplicative of state
criminal laws, and that its breadth and scope of application were undefined).
6 Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)).
7 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816, 816
(“The purpose is to protect enterprises using animals from domestic terrorism by individuals or
groups who object to the use of animals by medical researchers or commercial enterprises.”);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805 (“[The
Act] is intended to . . . protect[] persons employed at such facilities from acts of violence and
destruction.”).
2
3
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(B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier,
circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or
(C) any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural
arts or sciences.9
This expansive definition did not include any additional
qualifications, like a requirement that the enterprise employ a
threshold number of employees or devote a certain percentage of their
efforts to the use of animals.10 Because of the lack of clarifying
language, AEPA was potentially applicable to individuals or
companies who use animals or animal products in only a limited
capacity.11
In addition to broadly defining an animal enterprise, Congress
further complicated the statute’s interpretation by relying on the
ambiguous term “physical disruption” as the triggering conduct.12
Despite the fact that AEPA’s legislative history had previously
established that whistleblowers were not the bill’s target, the term
“physical disruption” left room for interpretation.13 Specifically, the
House Judiciary Committee recognized that the term was susceptible
to multiple, conflicting interpretations.14 The Committee expressed
concerns that, without greater clarification, AEPA could be used to
prosecute whistleblowers.
Regulators, humane societies, and labor unions rely on
whistleblowers and legitimate undercover investigations to
police conditions at food and fiber processing facilities and
determine compliance with animal welfare and labor
laws. . . . The ambiguous term “physical disruption” is not
defined, and could be construed to make criminal
whistleblowing activity that results in a facility being shut
down by regulators or protests. At best, this would have
chilled whistleblowing; at worst, it could have resulted in
actual prosecutions of whistleblowers. The bill reported by
the Judiciary Committee is intended to avoid criminalizing
18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C).
Id.
11 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 2 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816
(seeking to amend the bill to restrict coverage to specific entities most likely to be subjected to
acts of violence).
12 Animal Enterprise Control Act, Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (1992).
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 3 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805
(“Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to affect or limit the exercise of any right granted by
State or Federal whistleblower protection laws”).
14 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816.
9

10
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As a result, Congress followed the Committee’s recommendation
and defined “physical disruption.”16 But the definition failed to fully
remedy the statute’s ambiguity.17 The definition provided only that
“the term ‘physical disruption’ does not include any lawful disruption
that results from lawful public, governmental, or animal enterprise
employee reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal
enterprise.”18 Congress, however, did not include any illustration of
what constituted a “lawful disruption.”19 Thus, the definition failed to
provide the necessary clarity, and concerns about the statute’s scope
remained.20
On November 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed
AETA21 into law. AETA is a controversial amendment that expands
AEPA in three fundamental ways. First, it replaces the term “physical
disruption” with the broader term “interfering.”22 Second, it increases
the number of entities covered by AETA to include not only the
animal enterprise itself but also “any real or personal property of a
person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or
transactions with an animal enterprise.”23 Third, it creates an
independent source of liability for any individual who, by interfering
with an animal enterprise, places a person in reasonable fear of death
or bodily injury.24 AETA also retains the broad definition of “animal
enterprise.”25
B. The Potential Effect on Whistleblowers
Prior to AETA’s enactment, critics feared that a plain, technical
reading of AETA would convert traditional acts of whistleblowing
Id.
Animal Enterprise Control Act, Pub. L. 102-346, 106 Stat. 928 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 43(d)(2)).
17 See id.
18 Id.
19 The Animal Enterprise Protection Act has withstood a facial constitutional challenge on
vagueness grounds, however. See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 153 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he term ‘physical disruption’ has a well-understood, common definition.”).
20 See generally Kniaz, supra note 5 (discussing debates regarding AEPA’s scope and
breadth).
21 18 U.S.C. § 43.
22 Id. § 43(a)(1).
23 Id. § 43(a)(2)(A).
24 Id § 43(a)(2)(B). The statute’s language does not specifically require that the person
placed in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury have any connection to an animal enterprise.
See id.
25 Id. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C); see also supra text accompanying note 9.
15
16
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into a federal offense.26 Like the term “physical disruption,” the term
“interfering” is capable of multiple, conflicting interpretations. Courts
have concluded that “[t]o ‘interfere’ is to ‘oppose, intervene, hinder,
or prevent.’”27 The legal-dictionary definition of “interfere” is equally
broad. To interfere is “[t]o check; hamper; hinder; infringe; encroach;
trespass; disturb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose. To enter into, or
take part in, the concerns of others.”28 Moreover, courts have
interpreted “interfere” as pertaining to both conduct and speech.29
Under any of the above interpretations, it is plausible that an
individual who exposes the wrongdoings of an animal enterprise for
the purpose of imposing sanctions has intentionally “interfered” with
the enterprise.
AETA provides that whoever interferes with an animal enterprise
and causes damage in excess of ten-thousand dollars to property,
which includes the removal of animals or records, has satisfied the
elements of the Act.30 In many instances, the only evidence of
criminal or regulatory violations exists in these records, which a
whistleblower must then remove to prove that a violation has
occurred.31 In other cases, the best evidence of wrongdoing lies in the
physical condition of the animal itself.32 If an individual removes
property in the form of records or animals from an animal enterprise
for the purpose of exposing wrongdoing, it is conceivable that the
elements of the Act have been met.33
Concerns that AETA would be used by law enforcement to
prohibit well-intentioned acts dominated congressional hearings.
26 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H8593–94 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich)
(arguing that AETA’s language chills speech and potentially prohibits whistleblowing that
interferes with an animal enterprise).
27 United States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 704 (3d College ed. 1998)).
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (6th ed. 1990).
29 See, e.g., Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 381 (D. Conn. 1988), aff’d 862 F.2d 432
(2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating a portion of the Hunter Harassment Act that prohibited interfering
with the lawful pursuit or preparation or hunting because it encompassed both acts and speech).
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A).
31 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP ET AL., Head Injury Experiments on Primates at the
University of Pennsylvania, in THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL
CHOICE 177, 178 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Head Injuries] (describing the theft of documents at
the University of Pennsylvania that revealed callous researchers performing experiments on
baboons, which was a major impetus for the 1985 amendments to the Animal Welfare Act).
32 See, e.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934,
936 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the physical condition of the monkeys used in experiments
indicated numerous violations of animal cruelty laws); see also James J. Kilpatrick, Caged in
Poolesville, WASH. POST, May 12, 1986, at A15 (describing the conditions in the Int’l Primate
Prot. League case); Robert Reinhold, Fate of Monkeys, Deformed for Science, Causes Human
Hurt After 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1987, at A8 (relating issues of cruelty in the Silver
Springs case).
33 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)–(2).
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Members of the press argued, “[t]his legislation . . . will force
Americans to decide if speaking up for animals is worth the risk of
being labeled a ‘terrorist,’ either in the media or in the courtroom.” 34
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) argued that AETA
paint[s] everyone with the broad brush of terrorism who
might have a legitimate objection to a type of research or
treatment of animals that is not humane. . . . This bill is
written in such a way as to have a chilling effect on the
exercise of peoples’ first amendment rights.35
Long after the debates and the congressional hearings have ended,
concerns regarding the potential enforcement of AETA against
whistleblowers remain. After an undercover investigator associated
with the Humane Society of the United States videotaped
nonambulatory cows so diseased that they could not stand being
forced to slaughter in violation of USDA regulations, the USDA
recalled 143 million pounds of ground beef, the largest recall in
American history.36 The author of a New York Times article expressed
concern that because of the size of the recall and the economic harm it
caused, AETA would be used to prosecute the investigator.37
C. Effectuating the Legislative Intent of AETA
A literal reading of AETA’s terms alone may proscribe the
removal of records or animals for the purpose of whistleblowing.38 To
date, no court has had the opportunity to interpret the Act as it
pertains to whistleblowing, but when the opportunity arises, courts
should read beyond AETA’s terms in order to effectuate the statute’s
purpose.39 It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that where
34 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of William Potter, Journalist).
35 152 Cong. Rec. H8593 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich).
36 See BETTY FUSSELL, RAISING STEAKS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AMERICAN BEEF 269
(2008) (discussing the recall of beef due to health concerns arising from animal rights activists’
undercover operations).
37 See Kim Severson, Upton Sinclair, Now Playing on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2008, at F1 (discussing the possibility of AETA litigation).
38 See supra text accompanying notes 26–33.
39 See Gulf States Steel Co. v. U.S., 287 U.S. 32, 45 (1932) (“When possible, every statute
should be rationally interpreted with the view of carrying out the legislative intent.”); Hodges v.
Rainey, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (S.C. 2000) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never
Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975) (“the function of a court when dealing with a statute is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
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Congress has used language that is susceptible to multiple, conflicting
meanings, courts must effectuate the intent of the legislature by
reading beyond the statute’s plain language.40 From its inception,
AETA was concerned solely with prohibiting violence against animal
enterprises and their employees.41 Congress never intended to prohibit
whistleblowing. In fact, it specifically addressed and attempted to
remedy those portions of the statute that tended to inhibit
whistleblowing.42 After recognizing that the term “physical
disruption” was ambiguous and “could be construed to criminalize
whistleblowing activity that results in a facility being shut down by
regulators or protests,” Congress responded by including a limiting
definition.43 Hence, the statute was never aimed at hindering
whistleblowing, whatever its form.
The debates and testimony surrounding the 2006 amendments
were equally unconcerned with prohibiting whistleblowing. Rather,
the promoters of the bill argued that the increased scope was aimed
specifically at thwarting “domestic terrorism threats”44 and “multistate campaigns of intimidation.”45 AETA’s promoters argued that its
sole purpose was preventing violent attacks by extremists, which
could one day result in the loss of a human life.46 There is simply no
evidence that Congress amended AEPA to inhibit whistleblowing or
other traditionally protected activities.47 The Department of Justice
emphasized this point when, in the course of lobbying for the
40 See U.S. v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that because the
word “law” in the Lacey Act was susceptible to competing, reasonable interpretations, the court
must look to the legislative history of the statute to determine Congress’s intended purpose in
enacting the law to determine the proper meaning of the term).
41 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(I), at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805 (“Nothing
in this subtitle shall be construed to affect or limit the exercise of any right granted by State or
Federal whistleblower protection laws . . . .”).
42 H.R. REP. NO. 102–498 (II), at 4 (1992) (stating that the Bill was not meant to
encompass whistleblowing).
43 Id.
44 Eco-terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal
Liberation Front, Hearing Before the S Comm. on Env. and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 41 (2005)
(statement of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“The
written testimony provided to the Committee Referred to eco-terrorism as one of the most
serious domestic terrorism threat in the United States today . . . .”).
45 Id. at 13. Mr. Lewis elaborated: “[O]ne of our greatest challenges has been the lack of
Federal criminal statutes to address multi-state campaigns of intimidation. . . . Therefore, the
existing statutes may need refinements. . . .” Id. at 39–40.
46 Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. James M. Inhofe) [hereinafter Inhofe Statement] (“Experts
agree that although they have not killed anyone to date, it is only a matter of time until someone
dies as a result of ELF and ALF criminal activity.”).
47 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. On
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5–7
(2006) (statement of Brent McIntosh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice).
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amendments, it assured Congress that the amendments were not
intended to “prohibit or discourage the protected activities of
whistleblowers, protestors, and leafleters.”48
Despite legitimate concerns that AETA’s language renders it
susceptible to abuse and misinterpretation, Congress did not intend to
hinder whistleblowing or other traditionally protected activities. A
reviewing court seeking to effectuate AETA’s intent must read
beyond the bare terms and apply its penalties cautiously. Aside from
the legislative intent, the fact that the USDA, animal-enterprise
employees, and the American public rely on whistleblowers to ensure
compliance with anti-cruelty laws and maintain the integrity of the
food supply compels the conclusion that AETA should not be
enforced against whistleblowers.
II. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT, USDA ENFORCEMENT,
AND THE PROBLEM OF STANDING
A. Brief History of the Animal Welfare Act
The Animal Welfare Act49 is the core piece of federal legislation
aimed at regulating the use of millions of animals. In the early 1960s,
the public became increasingly aware that animal dealers were
stealing family pets and researchers were subsequently using those
pets in experimentation. Two closely occurring events spurred the
federal legislative push for tighter restrictions on the use of animals.
In 1965, a United States Representative contacted an animal dealer
about a missing Dalmatian believed to be on the dealer’s property.50
Troubled by the dealer’s lack of concern for the animal’s welfare and
whereabouts, he introduced a bill into Congress aimed at prohibiting
the theft of companion animals for research.51 Then, in 1966, Life
magazine profiled Lucky, an emaciated and frightened English
Pointer who was purchased at auction for three dollars.52 Lucky was
sold to a laboratory for experimentation53 and was one of
approximately two-million dogs used for research each year,54 An
astonishing half of these dogs were, like Lucky, family pets stolen by

Id. at 10.
7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006).
50 Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under
the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 796 (1997).
51 Id.
52 Stan Wayman, Concentration Camps for Dogs, LIFE, Feb. 4, 1966, at 22 (prior to the
publication Congress had eight bills pending).
53 Id.
54 Id.
48
49
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professional “dognappers.”55 The article described in vivid detail the
deplorable conditions in which dealers “simply dispose of their packs
at auction where the going rate for dogs is 30 cents a pound. Puppies,
often drenched in their own vomit, sell for 10 cents apiece.”56 The
article generated more letters to Congress than any other issue at the
time, including the Vietnam War.57
The legislature generally conceded that state laws were incapable
of regulating the mass quantity of animals demanded by the federal
government’s research program.58 Fueled by public outcry and the
pervasiveness of abuse revealed during Congressional hearings,59
Congress enacted the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (LAWA).60
LAWA’s stated objective was to protect owners of companion
animals by requiring animal dealers to obtain licenses and imposing
penalties on laboratories that purchase animals from unlicensed
dealers.61 Ensuring minimum standards of humane treatment was a
secondary purpose.62
Four years after initial promulgation, Congress revisited LAWA to
respond to the public’s concerns that it did not sufficiently protect
animal welfare.63 That year, Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act
of 1970 (AWA),64 which amended LAWA. In enacting the AWA,
Congress recognized that animals have a right to certain basic
necessities.65 To ensure that these needs were met, the Secretary of
55

Id. (citing estimates provided by the Humane Society of the United States).
Id.
57 EMILY STEWART LEAVITT, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL R IGHTS: A SURVEY OF
AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641 TO 1968, at 48–49 (1968).
58 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281, at 4–6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2636
(“The demand for research animals has risen to such proportions that a system of unregulated
dealers is now supplying hundreds of thousands of dogs, cats, and other animals to research
facilities each year. . . . Stolen pets are quickly transported across State lines, changing hands
rapidly . . . [and] State laws . . . proved inadequate both in the apprehending and conviction of
the thieves who operate in the interstate operation . . . .”); see also Mendelson, supra note 50, at
797 (discussing the inadequacy of state laws).
59 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2635.
60 Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the
transportation, sale, and handling of animals intended to be used for research or
experimentation).
61 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2133–34.
62 § 2131, 80 Stat. at 350 (noting that primary purpose was to protect theft of companion
animals).
63 See 116 Cong. Rec. 40,159 (1970) (statement of Rep. Wilmer Mizell).
64 Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131
(2006)).
65 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5104. The
Act provides that “animals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of adequate housing,
ample food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient ventilation, shelter from
extremes of weather and temperature, and adequate veterinary care including the appropriate use
of pain-killing drugs.” Id.
56
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Agriculture was required to issue regulations establishing that animals
receive “adequate housing, ample food and water, reasonable
handling, decent sanitation, [and] sufficient ventilation.”66 The
amendment was a self-proclaimed embodiment of Congress’s
continuing commitment “to the ethic of kindness.”67 Despite this
commitment, however, Congress remained reluctant to place
significant limitations on the actual use of animals in research and
experimentation. Under the bill, regulators did not have the power to
interfere with research or experimentation because “the research
scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door.”68
Following the 1970 amendments, Congressional hearings
continued to demonstrate widespread animal abuse.69 As a result,
Congress further amended the AWA in 1976.70 The 1976
amendments had three objectives: (1) to prevent animal abuse during
transportation; (2) to expand the scope of the term “animal”; and (3)
to curtail animal fighting for sport.71
The last meaningful revisiting of the AWA occurred in 1985, after
whistleblowers removed videotapes of experiments performed on
baboons at the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic.72 The
videotapes revealed that researchers had developed a contraption
designed to produce head injuries in baboons.73 Video footage
depicted the contraption striking the skulls of alert baboons at two
thousand times the force of gravity as researchers mocked the
animals.74 Congress enacted the Improved Standards for Laboratory
Animals Act (ISLAA)75 in the direct aftermath of the events.76

Id.
Id.
68 Id.
69 122 CONG. REC. 2860 (1976) (statement of Rep. Thomas Foley) (arguing that, despite
the 1970 law, “no substantial progress has been made toward the solution of [the animal abuse]
problem”).
70 See Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417
(1976).
71 Id. § 2131, 90 Stat. at 417.
72 See Head Injuries, supra note 31, at 177–80.
73 Id. at 178.
74 See id.
75 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1759, 99 Stat.
1645 (1985) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)) (clarifying and amending the
Animal Welfare Act in an attempt to improve the treatment of laboratory animals).
76 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, Inc., 204 F.3d 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“In 1985 Congress passed the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act amending the
Animal Welfare Act of 1966.”) (citation omitted); DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THE SCALPEL AND
THE BUTTERFLY: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RESEARCH AND ANIMAL PROTECTION 157 (2001)
(“The 1985 amendments (Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act), passed in the wake
of the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic debacle . . . .”).
66
67
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The ISLAA broadened the definition of “animal” and reflected
Congress’s goal of promoting the three R’s of research: “reduction in
the number of animals used, refinement of cruel techniques, and
replacement of animals with plants and computer simulations.”77 The
amendments sought to meet these goals by requiring: (1) the use of
tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics; (2) the principal researcher
to consider any technique likely to cause pain or distress;
(3) veterinary consultation regarding research protocols likely to
cause pain; and (4) the performance of only one major operation on
an animal, unless further operations were considered a scientific
necessity.78 The ISLAA also created Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committees (IACUC), an internal review mechanism aimed at
increasing the oversight and welfare of animals used in research.79
B. The Challenges of USDA Regulation
Since its inception, the AWA has been underenforced. Though the
USDA is the lead federal agency charged with enforcing the AWA,80
it has never felt fully suited for this role.81 As Secretary of Agriculture
Orville Freeman expressed in a 1966 letter:
In respect to animals, the functions of this Department relate
basically to livestock and poultry. Accordingly, there is a
question as to whether it would not be desirable that a law
such as that in question be administered by a Federal agency
more directly concerned and having greater expertise with
respect to the subject than this Department.82
In response to the proposed 1970 amendments, the USDA
supported the impending legislation, but again expressed concerns
about its role as the lead enforcement agency.83 The USDA attempted
to have the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare act as

137 CONG. REC. 8533 (1991) (statement of Rep. Lee Hamilton).
See S. REP. NO. 99-145, at 593 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N 731, 746.
79 See infra text accompanying notes 130–42.
80 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006).
81 Letter from Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman to Senator Warren G.
Magnuson, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce (Mar. 25, 1966) in S. REP. NO. 89-1281
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2643. (“[T]he application of this bill should be
limited to the care and handling of dogs and cats by dealers. The care and use of such animals
within research facilities pose more difficult problems.”).
82 Id.
83 See Letter from J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary of Agriculture, to Rep. W.R. Poage,
Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture (June 9, 1970), in H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651,
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5105–06.
77
78
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enforcer of the AWA.84 However, Congress had considered and
rejected this idea in the previous LAWA proposals.85 Congress
believed that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was
incapable of enforcing the AWA because to do so would result in
self-regulation by researchers.86
In addition to reluctantly adopting its role as regulator of animal
welfare, the USDA has consistently been understaffed and
inadequately funded.87 Thus, the USDA’s lack of internal motivation
is not the sole reason for the poor record of AWA enforcement; it is
also the result of insufficient resources.88 There are approximately
twenty regulated laboratories for each USDA inspector, resulting in
fewer inspections than are necessary to sufficiently regulate the
industry.89 The USDA recommends that each facility be inspected at
least four times per year, but due to strained resources, facilities are
inspected just once every one to two years.90 On the rare occasions
when laboratories are randomly inspected, they are frequently cited
for AWA noncompliance.91 Strained resources have contributed to the
under enforcement and ineffectiveness of the AWA.92
84 Id. at 5106 (“[W]e believe that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is the
appropriate agency to administer such an activity.”).
85 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2648.
86 Id.
87 In a 1976 article, Paula Rosen stated: “[i]nspections carried out by the Department have
often been either ineffective or nonexistent. This inadequacy is not only due to lack of
motivation within the Department to establish a strict enforcement policy, but is also the result
of insufficient funding to implement the necessary procedures.” See Paula Rosen, Federal
Regulation of Zoos, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 381, 395–96 (1976) (footnote omitted). A decade later, a
government accountability audit revealed that the AWA often went unenforced due to
insufficient funding, inadequate training, and simply too few inspectors. See GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-85-8, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S ANIMAL WELFARE
PROGRAM (1985).
88 See Joshua E. Gardner, Note, At the Intersection of Constitutional Standing,
Congressional Citizen-Suits, and the Humane Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen
the Animal Welfare Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 330, 331–32 (2000) (citing congressional
testimony regarding the inadequate inspection of research facilities); Madhusree Mukerjee,
Trends in Animal Research: Increased Concern for Animals, Among Scientists as Well as the
Public, Is Changing the Ways in Which Animals Are Used for Research and Safety Testing, SCI.
AM., Feb. 1997 at 92 (discussing the limited resources available to investigate these matters).
89 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92. (noting that under enforcement of laboratories is
well known and is illustrated by the fact that there are only sixty-nine inspectors for 1,300
regulated laboratories). The USDA’s shortcomings are not limited to the regulation of
laboratories. Rather, it is merely symptomatic of a general plague of under-funding. See Valerie
Stanley, The Animal Welfare Act and USDA: Time for an Overhaul, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
103, 109 (1998) (“[The] USDA only has 87 inspectors for the entire country and there are at
least 10,000 entities it regulates.”).
90 Collette L. Adkins Giese, Comment, Twenty Years Wasted: Inadequate USDA
Regulations Fail to Protect Primate Psychological Well-Being, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 221,
242–43 (2006).
91 In 1992, twenty-six laboratories were selected at random and inspected by the USDA.
Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92. The Office of the Inspector General's audit of the USDA's
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B. The Problem of Standing and the Lack of a Citizen-Suit Provision
Private plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate standing to enforce the
AWA against violators has further hampered AWA enforcement.
Standing is a threshold determinant for seeking judicial intervention
in the federal courts.93 Article III of the United States Constitution
limits federal jurisdiction to circumstances in which an aggrieved
party can articulate a “case or controversy.”94 In Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife,95 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking to
demonstrate standing must satisfy three elements. First, the plaintiff
must have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally
protected interest that is both actual and imminent, as well as concrete
and particularized.96 A legally protected interest can be created by
constitution, statute, or common law.97 In addition, the party seeking
redress must be amongst the parties seeking judicial review.98 Second,
the plaintiff’s injury must be causally connected, that is, fairly
traceable, to the alleged illegal actions of the defendant.99 Third, and
closely related to the second element, it must be likely that a
favorable decision will redress the plaintiff’s injuries.100 Generally,
this is a determination of whether the plaintiff has a legitimate stake
in the outcome of the litigation.101

enforcement activities revealed that twelve of the twenty-six laboratories selected were not in
compliance. Id.
92 See USDA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REP. NO. 33002-4-SF, ANIMAL
AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM INSPECTIONS OF
PROBLEMATIC DEALERS 3 (2010), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/33002-4SF.pdf (reporting the USDA’s acknowledgement that the Animal Welfare Act is under enforced
and ineffective).
93 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517–18 (1975) (noting that standing is a “threshold
determinant[] of the propriety of judicial intervention”).
94 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
95 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
96 Id. at 560.
97 See Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate
Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1076 (1994) (discussing the
requirements of standing and differentiating Article III from prudential standing). On numerous
occasions, the Supreme Court has held that the legally protected interest required for Article III
standing may exist solely by virtue of a statute. See e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”); accord Warth, 422 U.S. at
500 (noting that the only “injury” which exists may be solely a product of statute).
98 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972) (“[T]he injury in fact
test . . . requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”).
99 Lujan, 540 U.S. at 560 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976)).
100 Id. at 561.
101 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that whether a party has standing is
a question of whether the party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
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In addition to Article III standing, a plaintiff seeking to challenge
the decisions of a federal agency must demonstrate that she has
prudential standing.102 To demonstrate prudential standing, a plaintiff
usually must show that she is a member of the class of individuals
Congress intended to have the ability to challenge the agency’s
decisions, which is generally a question of whether the potential
plaintiff is within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by
the statute or regulation.103
Traditionally, animals have been unable to satisfy the first element
required to prove Article III standing; a legally protected interest.104
Under the common-law approach to animals, courts treated animal
ownership virtually the same as property ownership.105 In addition,
animals cannot establish a procedural right to file suit because no

controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends”).
102 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of the statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); see also Air Courier Conference
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524 (1991); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 609 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (“A plaintiff must show that it has suffered
injury-in-fact and that it falls within the zone-of-interests intended to be protected by the
governing statute.”).
103 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (for prudential standing, a plaintiff
demonstrate that the injury “arguably fall[s] within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit.”); Judicial Watch, Inc.
v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ‘zone-of-interests’ requirement of
prudential standing poses the question whether the plaintiff's interest is so incongruent with the
statutory purposes as to preclude an inference that Congress might have intended such a party as
a challenger.”).
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1333, 1359 (2000) (discussing the elements of standing).
105 GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 35 (Tom Regan ed., 1995)
(“for all intents and purposes, [animal ownership is] no different from the ownership of other
sorts of personal property.”); see also Kaufman v. Langhofer, 222 P.3d 272, 274 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2009) (“The majority of jurisdictions in the United States classify pets as personal property.”);
Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 535
(1998) (“[s]ince animals are property and have no rights, representatives of animals cannot
assert the interest of animals in the judicial system.”). In addition, numerous laws identify
specific animals as property. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 491 (West 2010) (“Dogs are
personal property, and their value is to be ascertained in the same manner as the value of other
property.”); W. VA. CODE 19-20-11 (2009) (“In addition to the head tax on dogs provided for in
this article, the owner of any dog above the age of six months shall be permitted to place a value
on such dog and have such dog assessed as personal property in the same manner and at the
same rate as other personal property.”). The view of animals as property is also well-established
in our common law tradition. See Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698,
700 (1897) (“By the common law, as well as by the law of most, if not all, the States, dogs are
so far recognized as property that an action will lie for their conversion or injury . . . .”);
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that loss
of consortium for the death of an animal was not a legally cognizable claim because animals
maintain a status of property under the law).
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federal statute permits an animal to bring suit in its own name. 106
Property cannot suffer a cognizable legal injury.107 Hence, animals
have no standing in the federal courts through statute or common law.
Nonetheless, animals have been named as individual plaintiffs in
several high-profile cases,108 and courts have, on occasion, suggested
that animals can have standing. Most notably, in Padila v. Hawaii
Dept of Land and Natural Resources,109 the court stated that “[a]s an
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act . . . the bird
(Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-creeper family,
also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff
in its own right.” In Padila, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs’
standing, however, and thus the Ninth Circuit did not have occasion
to address the issue.110 But irrespective of isolated suggestions to the
contrary, animals currently do not have standing to enforce animalprotection laws.111 Therefore, neither an animal nor a person can seek
judicial redress on an animal’s behalf.
Animals are left to rely on people to sue for enforcement of
animal-protection statutes.112 Several animal-protection statutes do
include a citizen-suit provision, which allows people to do just that.113
Courts, when interpreting these statutes, have found that Congress
intended to encourage private citizens to enforce these laws and
provided, as a measure of legislative enactment, standing to enforce
the laws through the citizen-suit provisions.114 While citizen-suit
106 Sunstein,

supra note 104, at 1359.
Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium,
836 F. Supp. 45, 49–50 (D. Mass. 1993) (concluding and citing cases for the proposition that
“cases in each state indicate that animals are treated as property of their owners, rather than
entities with their own legal rights,” and finding that a dolphin did not have standing to proceed
as a party in interest because it is property).
108 E.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir 1991); N. Spotted Owl
v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479
(W.D. Wash. 1988).
109 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988).
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. New England
Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 48–49 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that the citizen-suit provisions of
Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act provided for suits brought by
people and not animals); Haw. Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding
that the bird was not a “person” under the meaning of the Endangered Species Act’s citizen-suit
provision and that it therefore did not have standing to sue).
112 See Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum &
Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff had standing under the
citizens’ suit provision of Endangered Species Act but noting that any alleged injury must be the
plaintiff’s own injury as continuous harm to animals is insufficient to prove standing).
113 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006) (providing a citizen
suit); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (2006) (same).
114 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding
that Congress, in including the citizen suit provision as part of the Endangered Species Act,
intended to encourage private citizens to enforce its provisions and holding that the plaintiffs’
107 See
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provisions do not dispose of Article III standing altogether, they
expand standing to the outer boundaries of the case or controversy
requirement of Article III by including individuals who would
otherwise be unable to demonstrate the injury requirement.115
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
citizen-suit provisions “negate[] the zone of interest test.”116 That is,
by virtue of a citizen-suit provision, plaintiffs acquire prudential
standing.117 In Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps,118 the court was
asked to determine whether plaintiffs had standing to enforce the
Marine Mammal Protection Act under its citizen-suit provision.
Finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court declared, “[w]here
an act is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward
animals, who are uniquely incapable of defending their own interests
in court, it strikes as eminently logical to allow groups specifically
concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in
enforcing the statute.”119
Even though the AWA was motivated by considerations of the
humaneness towards animals, courts have consistently concluded that
Kreps was inapposite in AWA suits because, unlike the other animalprotection statutes, the AWA does not expressly provide for citizens’
suits.120 A major consequence of Congress’s failure to provide a

had standing to challenge the EPA’s use of strychnine); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d
1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that private citizens and environmental and animal
protection groups had standing to challenge a moratorium on the Marine Mammal Protection
Act); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Fla. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm., 550 F. Supp. 1206,
1208 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (“Under the citizens’ suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act, the
Plaintiffs have standing to sue in their own names to seek the protection of this Act for an
endangered species.”). The individual seeking to enforce a citizen suit provision must still
satisfy the irreducible elements of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992); see also Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 2d 55, 100 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that an informational injury not a legally protected
interest enforceable under the Endangered Species Act’s citizens’ suit provision).
115 See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that citizen-suit provisions do not do away with constitutional requirements for
standing altogether by extending but, rather, that it extends the Article III to maximum
constitutional limit).
116 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (holding that the citizen-suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act sufficiently broad to negate the zone of interest test).
117 See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15,
at *4 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Plaintiffs acquire prudential standing in relation to their ESA claims
pursuant to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA.”) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164
(1997)).
118 561 F.2d 1002.
119 Id. at 1007.
120 See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 936
(4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempts to become legal guardians of animals rescued from
National Institutes of Health funded laboratory after whistleblowers revealed documented
animal abuse that resulted in dozens of animal cruelty charges and the elimination of federal
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statutory right to file suit in the AWA is that private plaintiffs are
generally not considered to be within the zone of interests that
Congress sought to protect.121 Likewise, plaintiffs have generally
been unable to demonstrate that they have suffered a cognizable
injury as a result of an AWA violation, which is also necessary for
Article III standing.122 Thus, third parties lack standing to seek
judicial review for the researchers’ violations of the AWA.123
Individual plaintiffs have been more successful in challenging the
promulgation of USDA rules than enforcing the AWA.124
Reviewing courts generally agree that enforcement of the AWA is
solely within the discretion of the USDA.125 Because third parties do
not have standing to enforce AWA, private plaintiffs, including with
personal knowledge of AWA violations, must rely on the USDA
inspection process. Understaffing and inadequate funding, however,
have prevented meaningful compliance with the inspection
requirements.126 The result of the USDA’s inefficacy and third
parties’ inability to enforce the AWA is that animal enterprises are
left to self-regulate, directly contravening the intent of the AWA.127
C. The Failure to Self-Regulate
The biomedical-research industry has opposed the AWA since its
earliest stages.128 It has disputed each amendment and every attempt

funding for the project).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 938. Numerous courts have followed this line of reasoning and come to the
same determination. See, e.g., In Def. of Animals, et al. v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F.
Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (concluding that animal protection workers seeking to
challenge a zoo’s moving a gorilla did not have standing to enforce the provisions of the AWA);
see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Inst. Animal Care and Use Comm. of
Univ. of Or., 794 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d 817 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1991) (no
standing to enforce alleged violations of the AWA).
124 See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff had Article III standing based on aesthetic injury as a result of observing
primates housed in isolated conditions); Alt. Research and Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 12 (2000) (“[I]t necessarily follows that a researcher who witness the mistreatment
of rats in her lab must have standing.”).
125 See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that the animal welfare groups and individual citizens did not have standing to
challenge the USDA’s enforcement of the AWA); Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 941
(holding plaintiffs did not have standing under AWA).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
127 See S. REP. NO. 89-1281 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635, 2648 (rejecting
the idea that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare enforce the AWA because such
an arrangement would lead to self-regulation by medical researchers).
128 See Stanley, supra note 89, at 110 (noting that the National Association of Biomedical
Research, the main lobbying group for the biomedical industry, and its predecessors consistently
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to strengthen its provisions.129 In the first two decades, the AWA gave
researchers substantial discretion to regulate their uses of animals.130
But after highly publicized violations of state and federal anti-cruelty
laws, Congress created the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC or Committee).131 Modeled after Institutional
Review Boards, which ensure the ethical nature of research protocols
in which humans are subjects,132 the IACUC is a self-regulating entity
that oversees all aspects of the institution’s animal care and use
program for animal research.133 Federal law mandates that institutions
using laboratory animals create an IACUC. 134 The chief executive
officer of the institution must appoint this Committee,135 and the
Committee must have at least one member who is a non-scientist and
another who is unaffiliated with the institution and capable of serving
as a representative of the community.136 The USDA requires the
IACUC to approve procedures before they are conducted on
animals.137 In addition, the IACUC must establish appropriate
channels for researchers and other members of the institution to
express grievances regarding animal mistreatment, investigate all
complaints, and take appropriate remedial measures.138
Nonetheless, it is widely understood research institutions have
devoted little energy to IACUCs.139 They are rarely used and quite

opposed animal protection laws).
129 See, e.g., Estelle A. Fishbein, What Price Mice?, 285 JAMA 939, 941 (2001) (arguing
that proposed amendments to the AWA seeking to include mice, rats, and birds within the
AWA’s definition of “animal” must be thwarted and further arguing that laboratories coming
under the jurisdiction of the Public Health service should exempted from the AWA); Stanley,
supra note 89, at 110.
130 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1976) (describing the minimum standard requirements for
researchers).
131 Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1759, 99 Stat. 1650 (1985) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)).
132 See generally The Belmont Report: Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1979).
133 See 9 C.F.R. § 2.31 (2010) (listing the requirements for the IACUC).
134 Id.
135 See id. at § 2.31(b) (“The members of each Committee shall be appointed by the Chief
Executive Officer of the research facility”).
136 See id. at 2.31(a)–(c).
137 See Garrett Field & Todd A. Jackson, THE LABORATORY C ANINE 48 (2007) (describing
the IACUC’s functions and requirements); see Pierce Chow, The Functions of the Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee, in USING ANIMAL MODELS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: A
PRIMER FOR THE INVESTIGATOR 31, 31–37 (Pierce Chow, et al. eds., 2008) (describing a
functioning IACUC in the Singapore Health Services).
138 See PIERCE, supra note 135, at 36 (discussing the purpose and role of the IACUC in the
biomedical research industry).
139 See Rosamond Rhodes & James J. Strain, Whistle Blowing in Academic Medicine, 30 J.
MED. ETHICS 35, 35 (2004) (noting that these committees are often ineffective due to the lack of
institutional energy devoted).
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often remain ineffective as a vehicle to express grievances.140 Among
the major flaws is that the Chief Executive Officer of an IACUC
appoints all members. This has led to criticisms that only those
individuals willing to agree to the research are appointed to the
IACUC.141 Moreover, while the Committees are designed to
implement regulations, “[t]he regulations the [C]ommittees
apply . . . are minimal and can be waived if a majority of IACUC
members believe such action will enhance the experiment.”142
Research institutions more often view the Committees as an
impediment to research that must be circumvented, rather than a
means to effective research.143 Both progressive and conservative
groups, including those that are supportive of the use of animals in
biomedical research, have recognized that the IACUC is an
inadequate means of ensuring animal welfare.144
Because IACUCs rarely perform the function for which they are
designed, individual researchers must ensure that proper protections
are in place, and the USDA relies on individual researchers or other
private parties to act as individual whistleblowers.145 However,
researchers face enormous pressures not to come forward when they
are aware of unethical uses of animals.146 They are acculturated to be
loyal and not to blow the whistle on colleagues and other
researchers.147 This is not to imply that researchers never come
forward. There are always individuals who resist external and internal
pressures in an attempt to alert the public to the existence of

140 See id. (noting that due to the minimal amount of effort devoted by these committees,
they often remain ineffective).
141 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP ET AL, What Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, in THE
HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL CHOICE 197 (2d ed. 2008) (providing
examples where full committee review has been avoided).
142 DAVID NIBERT, ANIMAL R IGHTS/HUMAN RIGHTS: ENTANGLEMENTS OF OPPRESSION
AND LIBERATION 178 (2002).
143 See id. (noting that the members often regulate themselves).
144 See FRANCIONE, supra note 105, at 218 (“[N]ot only do more progressive organizations
regard USDA enforcement as ineffective, but so do organizations that, by and large, supported
biomedical research using animals.”); 1 THE EXPERIMENTAL ANIMAL IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH 46 (Bernard E. Rollin & M. Lynne Kesel eds., 1990) (noting that the public remains
skeptical of the 1985 amendment to the Animal Welfare Act because of its “ineffective
enforcement”).
145 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that under this framework, USDA inspectors
must rely on whistleblowers).
146 See Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 35 (noting that whistleblowers are often
punished for coming forward).
147 See T. Faunce et al., Supporting Whistleblowers in Academic Medicine: Training and
Respecting the Courage of Professional Conscience, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 40, 41 (2004) (arguing
that despite legislative and other measures, many researchers feel that they must adhere to a
code of silence with respect to misconduct or they will be viewed as traitors to their colleagues);
Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 37 (noting that to disclose is often to betray).

2/14/2011 5:28:20 PM

668

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

wrongdoings.148 When these researchers do come forward as
whistleblowers, however, they “are ostracised, pressured to drop
allegations, and threatened with counterallegations. They lose
desirable assignments, have their research support reduced and their
promotions and raises denied. Their contracts are not renewed, and
they are fired.”149 Although retaliatory acts for disclosure of AWA
violations are prohibited by law,150 the USDA rarely enforces these
protections.151 Adding to the problem, courts have held that, because
the AWA was not enacted for the special benefit of whistleblowers,
whistleblowers do not have a private cause of action for retaliation.152
Thus, the protections afforded by law are illusory.153
As a result, animal-protection advocates play a unique role as
whistleblowers under this framework.154 The USDA is incapable of
adequately investigating research institutions.155 The USDA,
therefore, relies on whistleblowers to come forward with knowledge
of AWA abuses.156 In order to come forward with information that
can change the misdirection of research, researchers are often forced
to go outside of the institution itself “because their own institutions
prefer[] sweeping their dirt under the rug.”157 One of the principle
148 See Stefan P. Kruszewski, Commentary, Why We Whistleblowers Are Passionate in
Our Convictions, 2 PLOS MED. 811, 811 (2005), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020281 (“For me, whistleblowing . . . has a
human face and tangible features. It is the face of children and adults who have been injured or
killed by misrepresented pharmaceuticals.”); Usman Jaffer & Alan E.P. Cameron, Deceit and
Fraud in Medical Research, 4 INT'L J. SURGERY 122, 125 (2006) (noting that most instances of
fraud are detected by colleagues and arguing for greater whistleblower protections in medical
research).
149 Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 35; see also Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92
(discussing the fact that the U.S.D.A. can offer few assurances to those who come forward with
complaints against researchers for violations of the Animal Welfare Act and detailing examples
of researchers at top institutions who were discharged after revealing violations of colleagues).
150 Animal Welfare Act, 9 C.F.R. § 2.32(c)(4) (2004) (“No facility employee, Committee
member, or laboratory personnel shall be discriminated against or be subject to any reprisal for
reporting violations or standards under the Act.”).
151 See FRANCIONE, supra note 105, at 214 (noting that while the USDA recommends four
visits to each laboratory each year, it is only able to visit a facility around once per year, and that
this undermines enforcement); Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that due to the USDA’s
shortage of investigators, “inspectors rely on whistleblowers” to come forward and reveal
incriminating information).
152 See Moor-Jankowski v. Bd. of Tr. of N.Y. Univ., No. 96 CIV. 5997(JFK), 1998 WL
474084, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998) (holding that no private caused of action existed for
retaliation after researcher revealed AWA violations).
153 Id.
154 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (explaining that the possibility provides an outlet for
researchers to act as whistleblowers and prevents researchers from violating the AWA).
155 Id.
156 See Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (noting that inspectors rely on whistleblowers).
157 Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 38; see also id. (describing a number of instances
of research misconduct and then discussing the manner in which the institutions chose to
conceal rather than correct the information).
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manner by which researchers are able to act as whistleblowers
without placing their reputation at risk is to provide information to
animal-welfare organizations.158 The prospect of this type of
announcement to animal-rights organization provides an incentive for
researchers follow protocols because once the information is revealed
to animal-rights organizations, unannounced inspections are soon to
follow.159 Violations revealed during these unannounced inspections
can spell the end for all funding on the project.160 Very frequently it is
the animal-protection groups who provide information to the USDA
inspectors, who then enforce the AWA.161 USDA inspectors,
individual researchers, and the American public have come to rely on
animal-protection groups to reveal detailed information.162 If the court
applied AETA to whistleblowers because they are in possession of
property that interferes with the operation of an animal enterprise it
would cut off the flow of vital information and have ruinous
consequences.
III. FACTORY FARMS, SLAUGHTERHOUSES, AND
POULTRY PROCESSING PLANTS
A. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA)163 is the primary
federal law charged with regulating the inner workings of factory
farms, slaughterhouses, and processing plants. Congress passed the
HMSA in 1958, at the height of public concern regarding
slaughterhouse cruelty.164 During four days of congressional
158 See id. at 35 (noting the IACUC model allows “outside forces to support the desired
behaviour”); Alex Nixon, Animal-Rights Issues at MPI Have Been Fixed, USDA Says,
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, July 25, 2008, at A7, available at http://www.mlive.com/business/
kzgazette/index.ssf?/base/business-5/1216997435311050.xml&coll=7 (describing how animal
rights organization alerted USDA of suspected violations after activists were tipped off by
whistleblowers within the company).
159 See Rhodes & Strain, supra note 139, at 37 (noting that a complaint by an outside
researcher to a whistleblower organization can have ruinous consequences).
160 See, e.g., id. (discussing loss of funding); Head Injuries, supra note 31, at 181 (noting
that funding for a major research project was cut after whistleblowers revealed videos of
documented animal abuse); Kilpatrick, supra note 32, at A15 (discussing the loss of National
Institutes of Health funding after whistleblowers revealed inhumane conditions at a laboratory).
161 See, e.g., Mukerjee, supra note 88, at 92 (quoting Harvey McKelvey of the USDA as
stating that the USDA and NIH rely on groups like PETA to infiltrate labs and produce detailed
histories of the noncompliance with research mandates); Nixon, supra note 158, at A7
(discussing an animal-rights group’s report to the USDA regarding a research facility’s AWA
violations).
162 See generally Mukerjee, supra note 88 (detailing the concern for animals among the
public and scientific community).
163 Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862 (codified as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2006)).
164 Id.; see also William M. Blair, Humane Appeals Swamp Congress: Senate Hearing on
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testimony on the proposed humane methods of slaughter, the
conditions of a typical American slaughterhouse were described in
harrowing detail:
a long line of helpless, healthy, fully conscious hogs [and]
sheep, cruelly shackled and dangling from one leg, twisting,
squirming, and screaming in agony as they approach the
executioner . . . . [A] close observer might have noticed a
hideously gruesome elongation of that poor shackled leg as a
bone snapped, or the joint pulled from its socket. . . . [T]heir
agonized screams smothered as they dropped mercilessly,
still conscious into a vat of scalding water.165
The testimony regarding cattle was similar.166 Before they were
shackled and taken to slaughter, cattle were struck in the skull with a
sledgehammer.167 Sometimes the cattle were rendered unconscious.
Often, however, the blows were misdirected and the animal was
merely disfigured or maimed.168 Those animals that remained
conscious through bludgeoning were gouged with meat hooks and
hoisted, left to have entire limbs ripped from their bodies as they
writhed in agony.169 On August 27, 1958, over strong objections from
the slaughter industry, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the
HMSA into law.170 The HMSA’s primary requirement was that
“animals [be] . . . rendered insensible to pain” before slaughter.171

Livestock Slaughter Bill Stirs Wide Interest and Mail Deluge, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1958, at 84
(like the AWA in 1966, during the period that the HMSA was pending, Congress received more
letters about it than any other issue). The issue had been alive for several years. Humane
slaughter bills had circulated in Congress since 1955. See 85 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1958)
(statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey) (noting that he had introduced the first humane slaughter
bill into Congress in 1955).
165 Humane Slaughtering of Livestock: Hearings on S. 1213, S. 1497, and H.R. 8308
Before S. Comm. of Agric. and Forestry, 85th Cong. 67 (1958) [hereinafter HMSA Hearings]
(statement of Madeline Bemelmans, President, Society for Animal Protection Legislation)
(reading the letter of W.P. Holcombe, a retired meat inspector, into the record).
166 Id. at 67.
167 See HMSA Hearings, supra note 165, at 30 (statement of Fred Myers, Executive
Director, Humane Society of the United States) (discussing the prevalence of the sledgehammer
as the primary mechanism for “stunning,” which often fails to render the animal unconscious
and stating that many of the animals were struck as many as ten times); see also id. at 78
(statement of Christine Stevens, President, Animal Welfare Institute) (stating that she had
personally witnessed thirteen blows from a sledgehammer delivered to a single animal).
168 See id. at 68 (statement of Madeline Bemelmans, President, Society for Animal
Protection Legislation) (describing that haphazard swinging of the sledgehammer often failed to
render the animal unconscious and often left the animal with a “preliminary broken snout, an ear
sheered off, or an eye gouged out”).
169 See id. at 78 (statement of Christine Stevens, President, Animal Welfare Institute)
(describing the torturous conditions she witnessed at slaughterhouses).
170 See 104 CONG. REC. 19,717 (1958) (record of signing the bill into law); HMSA
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B. USDA Enforcement of the HMSA
The USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is
responsible for regulating the inner workings of factory farms,
slaughterhouses, and processing plants.172 Enforcement of the HMSA
often overlaps enforcement of federal food safety regulations, both of
which are regulated by FSIS.173 The FSIS has recently been the
subject of increased scrutiny for its failure to consistently enforce the
HMSA and food safety regulations.174 Sixty years after it was enacted
into law, the HMSA is still not regularly enforced, and slaughterhouse
conditions remain similar to those described during the 1958
congressional hearings.175 The HMSA’s mandate that animals be
rendered “insensible to pain” often goes unenforced.176 Reports reveal
that animals have remained conscious during slaughtering, sometimes
moving their eyes and attempting to walk as the flesh is stripped from
their bodies.177 There are further indications that these occurrences
happen “on a daily basis” in “plants all over the United States.”178

Hearings, supra note 165, at 175 (statement of L. Blaine Liljenquist, Vice President, Western
States Meat Packers Ass’n, Inc,) (noting that slaughterhouses are “strongly opposed to the
compulsory features of these bills”); see generally HMSA Hearings, supra note 165, at 131–42
(statement of C.H. Eshbaugh, Consultant, American Meat Institute) (defending slaughterhouse
techniques and stating opposition to the bills).
171 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
172 See 21 U.S.C. § 603(b) (2006) (requiring the USDA to make humane slaughter
inspections). See also Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weaknesses in USDA Enforcement
Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th
Cong. (2010) (statement of Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and Environment)
[hereinafter Enforcement], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/
Domestic_Policy/2010/030410_Horse_Slaughter/030110_111th_DP_Lisa_Shames_GAO_0304
10.pdf (discussing the USDA and FSIS’s role in enforcing the HMSA).
173 See Enforcement, supra note 172, at 2 (noting that FSIS “cannot track HMSA
inspection funds separately from the inspection funds spent on food safety activities”).
174 See, e.g., Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weakness in USDA Enforcement, Before
the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Wayne Pacelle, the Humane Society of the United States) [hereinafter
Pacelle Testimony], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Domestic_
Policy/2010/030410_Horse_Slaughter/030310_111th_DP_Wayne_Pacelle_030410.pdf
(describing undercover inspections performed by the Humane Society of the United States and
proposing regulatory reforms).
175 See id. at 2 (describing hidden video that showed animals being kicked, electrocuted,
and skinned alive).
176 See Joby Warrick, ‘They Die Piece by Piece’: In Overtaxed Plants, Humane Treatment
of Cattle Is Often a Battle Lost, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Piece by Piece]
(detailing repeat violations at dozens of slaughterhouses); Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting
to Happen: Beef-Inspection Failures Let in a Deadly Microbe, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at A1
(describing how USDA failures allow microbes such as E-Coli to enter meat packages and
sicken those that consume it).
177 See Piece by Piece, supra note 176, at A1 (describing how a slaughterhouse worker
strips off flesh from the bodies of cattle as they move their eyes and attempt to walk).
178 Piece by Piece, supra note 176, at A10 (quoting Lester Friedlander, a former
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Recent investigations have revealed an abundance of HMSA
violations at major American slaughtering facilities. These include
cows being rammed with forklifts, electrocuted, chained and dragged
behind heavy machinery, prodded in the eyes, tortured with highpressure hoses to simulate drowning, as well as calves less than a
week old shocked with electrical prods as many as thirty times and
doused with water to increase electrical shocks.179 Other videos
obtained by animal-welfare and animal-rights organizations clearly
revealed that animals were not rendered insensible to pain before
slaughter, including one instance where a calf remained vocal after its
head had been halfway removed.180
In response to numerous reports of abuse, the government recently
commissioned a study to determine the cause behind FSIS’s poor
enforcement record.181 The study analyzed the responses of randomly
selected USDA inspectors at 257 slaughter plants and a sample of
FSIS noncompliance reports for the 2005 through 2009 fiscal years.182
The results of the study confirmed that the HMSA is inconsistently
enforced.183 The report also revealed that inconsistent enforcement is,
in part, the result of inspector ignorance and a lack of training.184
According to the government’s data, only a minority of inspectors
would take appropriate regulatory action “in response to excessive
beating or prodding,” which, according to FSIS guidelines, may
warrant suspension of plant operations.185 A majority of inspectors
considered themselves undertrained in identifying and responding to
“double stunning,” “beating,” electrical prodding,” “electrical
stunning failure,” and “slips and falls.”186 In addition, more than forty

government inspector and veterinarian). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04247, HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: USDA HAS ADDRESSED SOME PROBLEMS BUT
STILL FACES ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 4 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d04247.pdf (finding 553 violations of federal law
at 272 facilities).
179 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1–2 (describing undercover investigations
that documented horrendous conditions at slaughterhouses).
180 Id. at 2.
181 See Enforcement, supra note 172, at 1 (indicating that, due to recent violations,
Congress held hearings on March 4, 2010, to probe efforts taken by the United States
Department of Agriculture to enforce the HMSA).
182 Id.
183 Id. Other government-produced reports have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NONAMBULATORY LIVESTOCK AND THE
HUMANE METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT, 45 (2009), available at http://www.national
aglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22819.pdf (noting that previous studies concluded that HMSA
enforcement was inconsistent).
184 Enforcement, supra note 172, at 2.
185 Id. at 3.
186 Id. at 4 & fig.2.
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percent of inspectors considered themselves undertrained and in need
of additional guidance in the humane-handling enforcement of
“animal sensibility” and “sensible animal on bleed rail,” which is
whether the animal is sensible during slaughter.187 Thus, in some
respects, poor HMSA enforcement is simply the result of inspector
and USDA incompetence.
While underenforcement of the HMSA is partially the result of
ignorance, other contributing factors are less benign. On numerous
occasions, inspectors have been observed directly participating in the
animal abuse.188 Undercover video investigations revealed USDA
inspectors laughing as sick calves, covered in their own excrement,
were mocked and thrown against trailer walls.189 Other footage has
revealed USDA inspectors failing to act when faced with serious
violations. In one instance, a USDA inspector observed a worker
attempting to skin a live calf but failed to intervene.190 The inspector
simply watched the abuse and informed the worker that if another
inspector saw the abuse the plant would have to be shut down.191 In
other footage, the FSIS inspector instructed the undercover
investigator not to tell him if a live calf was in a pile of dead calves
because, “I’m not supposed to know. I could shut them down for
that.”192
C. Retaliation for Disclosure
Individuals within the industry who attempt to reveal violations are
frequently met with swift and strong retaliatory actions. Laborers in
these industries cannot be expected to regularly step forward and
reveal instances of cruelty because of increased deportation threats.193
These industries have, in many respects, effectively shielded
themselves from exposure by almost exclusively hiring
undocumented workers who persist in illegal conduct under the
constant threat of deportation.194 The enterprises with the worst
187 Id.
188 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1–2 (recounting examples of USDA
inspectors engaging in animal cruelty).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
193 See David Griffith, Food Processing, in IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA TODAY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 127 (James Louckey et al. eds., 2006) (noting that since 2001, factory farms,
meatpacking plants, and poultry facilities, all of which depend heavily on undocumented
laborers, have increased threats of deportation against those who seek to speak out against the
company).
194 See 2 CRITICAL FOOD ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS
WORLDWIDE 35 (Lynn Walter ed., 2009) (noting that labor laws are consistently broken and the
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records of food-safety and animal-cruelty violations have long been
the target of immigration officials.195 Workers in these industries who
attempt to come forward often face the risk of retaliation in the most
extreme form.196
USDA inspectors also have strong incentives not to come forward
with reports of violations.197 Dr. Dean Wyatt, the supervisory public
health veterinarian for FSIS198 and the supervisory veterinarian at
Seaboard Farms in Oklahoma, witnessed serious violations, including
“[c]onscious pigs shackled to the conveyor line, having their throats
slit while kicking and squealing” and animals crushed to death as they
were unloaded from trucks, and numerous unprovoked beatings.199
When Dr. Wyatt attempted to enforce compliance, he was
reprimanded by the USDA, instructed to devote less time to humane
handling, temporarily demoted, and ultimately transferred to
Bushway Packing, a calf slaughtering plant in Western Vermont.200
Dr. Wyatt witnessed similar abuses at Bushway Packing. Cattle
were chaotically shot numerous times in the head with bolt guns,
leaving them writhing in pain; animals less than a week old and too
dehydrated to stand were dragged on the ground or thrown across
rooms or into stalls; and infant calves were haphazardly stunned with
electrical prods and unnecessarily beaten.201 When Dr. Wyatt
protested the abuses, he was again reprimanded.202 While the USDA
threat of deportation consistently reinforced in so that undocumented laborers will accept
illegally low wages, will not speak with union reps, and will acquiesce to the status quo).
195 See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, Egg Recall: Supplier Reported to Have History of
Health, Safety Violations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
16748714 (noting that the supplier of eggs and chickens in the 14-state recall of 450,000 eggs
believed to be contaminated with salmonella has a long history of citations for health, safety,
and employment violations, including the hiring of undocumented immigrants, which resulted in
immigration raids). In 2003, just months after a paying a $130,000 fine for animal cruelty, the
egg supplier pled guilty to knowingly hiring illegal immigrants. The Today Show:
Congressional Investigation Now Under Way into Egg Recall: Former Labor Secretary Robert
Reich Weighs in, (NBC television broadcast Aug. 24, 2010).
196 See CRITICAL FOOD ISSUES, supra note 192, at 35 (detailing the retaliation threats
against workers who come forward with information about violations).
197 See Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: Weakness in USDA Enforcement, Before the H.
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Dr. Dean Wyatt, FSIS Supervisory Public Health Veterinarian) [hereinafter Wyatt
Testimony], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10487t.pdf (testifying about retaliatory
actions taken against FSIS officials for revealing food safety and criminal violations).
198 See Slaughterhouse Whistleblower Reveals Inhumane Animal Treatment, Food Integrity
Violations, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 04, 2010), http://www.whistleblower.
org/press/press-release-archive/381-slaughterhouse-whistleblower-reveals-inhumane-animaltreatment-food-integrity-violations [hereinafter Whistleblower].
199 Id; see also Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 2–5 (describing the same events).
200 Whistleblower, supra note 198; Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 6–8.
201 See Whistleblower, supra note 198.
202 Id.
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refused to bring charges against the plant for its numerous, severe
violations, the USDA retaliated against Wyatt for disclosing the
violations by requiring him to attend remedial training, which was
made public in a newsletter circulated throughout the industry that
caused substantial damage to Wyatt’s reputation.203
D. The Link Between Animal Abuse and Food Safety
Concerns about FSIS’s enforcement record have risen sharply in
light of increased awareness of the link between animal cruelty and
food safety. Downed cattle, those too sick to stand, have a
significantly increased risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
infection, or “mad cow disease,” and food-borne pathogens, including
E. Coli. and Salmonella.204 After a downer cow in Washington State
tested positive for mad cow disease in early 2004, the USDA began
implementing regulations prohibiting the slaughter of downed cows
for human consumption.205 The meat industry has challenged those
regulations that seek to remove downer cows or other diseased
animals from the food supply.206 While industry officials were unable
to overturn the laws and regulations, they found inventive ways to
circumvent enforcement.207 Cattle too sick to stand have routinely
been electrically prodded and stunned, pushed, sprayed with hoses,
kicked, or rammed with forklifts, or chained and dragged behind
heavy machinery to cause temporary movement to avoid a
203 See Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 7 (discussing that the plant manager filed
formal complaints against him for harassment and that he was forced to undergo remedial
measures); Whistleblower, supra note 198 (discussing the retaliatory acts taken by the USDA
against Wyatt following his disclosure of the plant’s violations).
204 See C. M. Byrne, Characterization of Escherichia Coli O157:H7 from Downer and
Healthy Dairy Cattle in the Upper Midwest Region of the United States, 69 APPLIED & ENVTL.
MICROBIOLOGY 4683, 4683 (2003) (300% greater prevalence of E. Coli. in downer cattle than
healthy cattle); BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or Mad Cow Disease), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/ (discussing the
causes of BSE); Press Release, USDA, FSIS Publishes Final Rule Prohibiting Processing of
“Downer” Cattle (Jul. 12, 2007) available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_events/
NR_071207_01/index.asp (discussing USDA final rule on prohibition against downer cows
entering the food supply).
205 See Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food Requirements
for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle, 9 C.F.R. pts. 309–11, 318–19 (outlining
the regulation changes made in response to the events in Washington); see also Baur v.
Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge
USDA regulations permitting introduction of downer cows into food supply because plaintiff
suffered injury-in-fact based on increased risk of contracting illness from diseased animals).
206 See, e.g., Nat'l Meat Ass’n. v. Brown, No. 1:08-cv-01963 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 426213
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2009) (challenging California law prohibiting the use of downed cows for
human consumption), vacated, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
207 See Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Schafer, No. 1:08-cv-00337-HHK (D.D.C. 2008)
(challenging regulation based on the lack of public notice under 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq.).
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determination that the cow is a downer unfit for human
consumption.208
Federal and state governments have tried to remove downer cows
from the food supply in a two-fold attempt to promote humane
treatment to animals and create a safer food supply for the American
public.209 Recognizing that slaughterhouses and processing plants
used these tactics to circumvent the rule, the federal government, as
well as several states, issued new regulations and enacted additional
legislation aimed at closing this loophole.210 Once again, the factory
farming, slaughtering, and processing industries have opposed these
measures.211
E. The Role of Whistleblowers
Because the meat industry has refused to self-regulate, laborers
face an uncertain future if they come forward, and inspectors are
retaliated against for properly revealing violations. Thus, it is
incumbent upon whistleblowers unaffiliated with the facility to
preserve the integrity of America’s food supply and reveal instances
of animal cruelty. News reports of large-scale food recalls and plant
closures as a result of substandard conditions are common. 212 In the
months of April and May of 2008 alone, undercover investigators
revealed egregious violations in Texas, Pennsylvania, New Mexico,
and Maryland.213 In August 2009, undercover investigators at
Bushway Packing in Vermont revealed violations so extreme that,
upon release of the footage, the plant was closed.214 Then in May
2010, undercover investigators revealed similar violations in Ohio.215
208 See Complaint at 3–4, Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Schafer, No. 1:08-cv-00337-HHK
(D.D.C. 2008).
209 See, e.g., Press Release, USDA, Agric. Sec’y Ed Schafer Announces Plan to End
Exceptions to Animal Handling Rule (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/
portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2008/05/0131.xml (announcing proposed
rule to ban all non-ambulatory cattle from food supply).
210 See, e.g., Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25990
(West 2010) (removing all downer cows from the food supply).
211 See Nat’l Meat Assoc., 2009 WL 426213 (challenging California law prohibiting the
use of downed cows for human consumption), see also Press Release, Humane Soc’y of the
U.S., Meat Indus. Seeks to Overturn Cal. Law Barring Sick, Disabled Farm Animals from Food
Supply, (Jan. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Humane Soc’y Press Release] available at
http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/press_releases/meat_industry_seeks_to_overturn
_downer_ban_012709.html (describing the meat industry’s attempts to overturn legislation
aimed at prohibiting the use of downer cows).
212 See Fussell, supra note 36, at 269 (noting that in June 2007, the California based
Vernon Food Group recalled 5.7 million pounds of E. Coli. contaminated beef after reports of
illnesses surfaced in six Western states).
213 See Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 1.
214 See Slaughterhouse Co-Owner Surrenders on Animal Cruelty Charge, Burlington (Vt.)
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No events generated more publicity than the video footage
obtained when an undercover investigator associated with the
Humane Society of the United States gained access to the
Hallmark/Westland plant in Chino, California.216 When footage of the
abuse surfaced, the USDA recalled 143 million pounds of ground
beef, the largest recall in American history.217 Had this video never
surfaced, the impact on the food supply could have been disastrous.
Hallmark/Westland is one of the top two suppliers of beef to the
National School Lunch Program.218 The 143 million pounds of
recalled meat was destined for children’s lunches in forty-seven
states.219 Following the video’s release, journalists and citizen watch
groups speculated that had the whistleblower been affiliated with an
organization less prominent or mainstream than the Humane Society
of the United States, charges might have been brought under
AETA.220 Clearly, these and similar activities, regardless of the
economic harms they might cause to the industry or the enterprise, are
not the activities that AETA’s drafters intended to prohibit.221
CONCLUSION
While AETA’s terms alone could conceivably prohibit certain acts
of whistleblowing, this was not its intended purpose. Congress’s

Free Press, Aug. 10, 2009, available at 2010 WLNR 15986965 (reporting that co-owner of
Bushway Packing Company surrendered to Vermont law enforcement after undercover Human
Society videos revealed that he was excessively electrocuting calves prior to slaughter, which
led to the plant’s closing); see also Pacelle Testimony, supra note 174, at 2–3. (discussing
Bushway videos) and Wyatt Testimony, supra note 197, at 6–8 (discussing the cruelty he
witnessed as FSIS veterinarian at Bushway).
215 See Holly Zachariah, Farm Owner Won’t Face Animal Abuse Charges, Columbus
Dispatch, Jul. 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news
/stories/2010/07/06/cow-abuse-charges.html (describing how an activist went undercover on a
dairy farm in Marysville, Ohio captured images of an employee “viciously beating and abusing
cows and calves,” which led to 12 counts of animal cruelty).
216 See Carla Hall, Career Ark of an Animal Defender, L.A. Times, Jul. 19, 2008, at A1
(discussing the undercover investigations at Hallmark/Westland).
217 See Fussell, supra note 36, at 269.
218 Humane Soc’y Press Release, supra note 211.
219 See Fussell, supra note 36, 269; USDA Announces Ban on Downer Cattle, Closing
Loophole, Humane Soc’y of the U. S. (May 20, 2008), http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/our
news/usda_announces_downer_ban_052008.html (noting that on January 31, 2008, the USDA
urged schools in 36 states to stop serving the contaminated meat but further noting that without
identification and early notice the meat would have effected 47 states).
220 See Severson, supra note 37, at F3 (questioning whether the tremendous economic
damages caused by the recall would lead to prosecution and suggesting that had the activist been
tied to PETA or with less public support than the Humane Society of the United States,
prosecutions under AETA might have ensued).
221 See text accompanying supra notes 34–44 (discussing the scope of AETA’s
prohibitions).
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stated objective in enacting AETA was to eliminate domestic
terrorism threats. AETA’s legislative history clearly reveals that it
was never intended to inhibit whistleblowing, and its drafters
attempted to clarify those aspects of the statute most likely to deter
whistleblowing. A court seeking to effectuate the full intent of the
statute must be mindful of this history and apply its penalties
cautiously. Any restrictions on whistleblowers could have farreaching consequences. The USDA, animal-enterprise employees,
and the American public rely on whistleblowers to ensure that anticruelty laws are complied with and that the integrity of the American
food supply is preserved.
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